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Abstract This article focuses on the power of technological mediation from the point
of view of autonomist Marxism (Hardt, Negri, Virno, Berardi, Lazzarrato). The first
part of the article discusses the theories developed on technological mediation in
postphenomenology (Ihde, Verbeek) and critical theory of technology (Feenberg) with
regard to their respective power perspectives and ways of coping with relations of
power embedded in technical artifacts and systems. Rather than focusing on the clashes
between the hermeneutic postphenomenological approach and the dialectics of critical
theory, it is argued that in both the category of resistance amidst power-relations is at
least similar in one regard: resistance to the power of technology is conceptualized as a
reactive force. The second part of the article reads technological mediation through the
lens of the antagonistic power-perspective on class struggle developed in autonomist
Marxism. The outline of a provisional autonomist philosophy of technology is devel-
oped using Foucauldian dispositifs of biopower in contrast to the hermeneutic and
dialectical approach. It is thus argued that resistance should here be understood in terms
of practice that subverts the technically mediated circuit of production itself.
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1 Introduction
How can we conceptualize resistance in our technologically mediated world? Perhaps
the word resistance rings alarm bells with contemporary philosophers of technology,
especially with those who have stressed the essentially interwoven character of man
and technology. For does not resistance imply a retreat into neo-Luddism, a denial of
the fact that our lives are so saturated by technological mediation, that any such retreat
is nothing more than false nostalgia, a longing in vain for an authentic state of being
that our modern technological world has diluted? In the following, we will deal with
resistance, but not of the neo-Luddite sort. We deal with resistance in view of the power
of capitalism.
Marx was the first to extensively theorize the relations between power, capitalism,
and technology, and following up on (a certain tendency in) his thought that technology
is not socially neutral, such present day philosophers as Andrew Feenberg (1991,
2002), Graeme Kirkpatrick (2008), and Douglas Kellner (1992) have devised a neo-
Marxist critical theory of technology revolving mainly around the issue of how the
social and the technical intertwine. But not everyone is a Marxist. Under the label
postphenomenology, Don Ihde (1990), Don Ihde and Evan Selinger (2003), and Peter-
Paul Verbeek (2005) have focused on the transformative dimension of technical
artifacts on human experience, their efforts revolving around the concepts of technical
mediation and relational ontology. Among their claims has been the discrediting of
Marxist approaches, charging the latter with a lingering but inherent technophobia
(Verbeek 2013). On their part, critical theorists have taxed postphenomenology with a
disregard for the political implications of technology, or more generally, for not coming
to terms with the power of technology (Feenberg 2009). This clash between these
dominant currents in philosophy of technology has sparked some debate between
scholars from these schools, leading to concessions on both sides. Feenberg’s recent
work, for example, explicitly deals with phenomenology and social constructivism, and
has a markedly less distinct Marxist flavor (2010). Verbeek (2011) has addressed the
normative lack of postphenomenology by dealing with the power of technology within
liberal democracies. This debate is by its very nature political, and thus encompasses
such themes as democratization, power, resistance, and so on. Given their differing
methodological, epistemological, and ontological frameworks, it comes as no surprise
that postphenomenologists have come up with different interpretations of filling in
these themes than critical theorist have. In this article, we will bring a third voice into
this debate, the voice of autonomist Marxism, associated in the present day with such
authors as Antonio Negri, Franco Berardi, Maurizio Lazzarato, and Nick Dyer-
Witheford but not frequently associated with the discourse on technological mediation.
We argue that autonomist Marxism offers an alternative understanding of how to
conceptualize the power of technology: instead of understanding the representative
political realm as the arena of struggle, resistance is placed back in the productive
circuit, the locus originalis of the power of antagonism. Another great commentator of
capitalism, Michel Foucault, once remarked that B[w]here there is power, there is
resistance^ (1978, p. 95), but giving meaning to this truism is less trivial than it may
seem. In the next section, we will review how this has been done in
postphenomenology and critical theory of technology, focusing on the works of the
figureheads Verbeek (who gives a Foucauldian reading) and Feenberg (who bases his
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view on Marcuse). Instead of understanding their approaches as radically opposed, it is
argued that their views are largely congenial to each other in their pragmatism for
construing the good life. In particular, we take issue with the claim made in
postphenomenology that Marxist approaches cannot account for the technical consti-
tution of human subjectivity. Thereafter, we propose an alternative way of understand-
ing power/resistance by drawing on the incorporation of Foucault’s work within the
autonomist tradition, focusing on the Marxist interpretation given to his notion of
biopower. The result of this will be a provisional outline of an autonomist view on
technology: the mediation of the class struggle.
2 The Power of Technological Mediation
The triad of capitalism, technology, and power is to be questioned with regard to
mediation. While capitalism may be uncontroversially defined as a politico-economic
system based on property, the privatization of the means of production, surplus value
extraction, capital accumulation, and the social relations that go with it, and technology
trivially characterized as any man-made utensil or machine to serve some kind of need
or purpose, the notion of power is much more ambiguous. To be sure, in the context of
societal matters, power is unequivocally linked to politics, to the field in which
decisions relating to the collective are contested, organized, and settled. In particular,
power relations, the exercise of power by one social agent (institution, group, class,
etc.) over another, operate as an area of struggle and become an issue of debate
assigned to the political realm.
According to Brey (2007), following and amending Fay’s (1987) general categori-
zation of five systematic power relations, technology can enhance and transform the
manner in which coercion, seduction, force, manipulation, and leadership are
exercised. For example, a country possessing nuclear weapons has strong coercive
power over others lacking such weapons, and it is well known how advertisements are
employed in various media to seduce their users into consumption. Latour (1992) has
drawn attention to how artifacts can exhibit force by triggering behavioral responses
from their users, while technology can have a manipulate twist when we think of
malware and spyware secretly nesting itself in PCs, and a policeman’s uniform confers
and strengthens the authority of its wearer over the public.
In the following, we do not aim to analyze the intertwinement of power and
technology in its various incarnations and facets, but focus, rather, on the entan-
glement of power and technological mediation in view of capitalist power rela-
tions. In so doing, we will defend a particular conceptualization of power: largely,
we follow Michel Foucault’s trajectory of the study of power through processes of
subjectification, to wit, Btechnologies of power,^ which Bdetermine the conduct of
individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, [through] an
objectivizing of the subject^ (Foucault 1997a, p. 225), and more precisely, the
manner this conceptualization of power has been elaborated by the autonomist
Marxists. While generally considered a historian and philosopher of discourse,
attention has been drawn to the relevance of Foucault’s work on power for
philosophy of technology, Discipline and Punish in particular (Dorrestijn 2012;
Gerrie 2003; Sawicki 2003; Verbeek 2011).
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In Discipline and Punish, we recall, Foucault sketches an outline of Western Europe
modernizing in tandem with the waning of Bsovereign power^ localizable in, and
possessed by, the figure of the King, and the waxing of Bdisciplinary power^, that
power which not so much represses as produces the subject, rendering its body ever
more docile and utile.1 Methodologically, Foucault undertakes this endeavor to dis-
lodge the study of power, to move it away from the juridico-discursive model (Foucault
1978, p. 90) and toward one that studies it in its positive, material, and technological
determinations:
[I]n short, this power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the ‘privilege’,
acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic
positions—an effect that is manifested and sometimes extended by the position of
those who are dominated. Furthermore, this power is not exercised simply as an
obligation or a prohibition on those who ‘do not have it’; it invests them, is
transmitted by them and through them. (Foucault 1977, p. 26f.)
In this conception of power, the subject has a dual character: it both constitutes and
is constituted by relations of power. Historically, Foucault locates the emergence of
such power in the eighteenth century and sees it as being exercised in disciplinary
institutions such as hospitals, prisons, schools, and factories, which, as propagators of
Bknowledge-power,^ produce norms about what counts as normal and what counts as
abnormal, as healthy and as ill, and so forth. Foucault’s best-known example of how
disciplinary power can be embedded in artifacts is Bentham’s circular prison, the
Panopticon, in which prisoners do not know whether they are being observed or not.
While Foucault generally reserves the word Btechnology^ for reference to manners in
which subjects are governed, this example can be taken as paradigmatic for a study of
how power can constitute subjects in a material fashion (Feenberg 2002, p. 68). In his
later work on self-mastery and ethics as self-conduct in the texts of Greek, Roman, and
early Christian authors, Foucault (1990, 1992) would shift his attention away from
studying how subjects are constituted as Bobjects^ of power, and concentrate on how,
amidst relations of power, subjects can also constitute themselves as subjects, through
so-called Btechnologies of the self^ (Foucault 1997a), and how such Btechnologies of
the self^ may intertwine with Btechnologies of domination^.
To be sure, in the Foucauldian usage of the word, power does not necessarily bear
the pejorative connotation it may have in a more colloquial idiom. With reference to
Habermas’ ideal communicative speech community, Foucault remarks that BI do not
think that a society can exist without power relations, if by that one means the strategies
by which individuals try to direct and control the conduct of others^ (Foucault 1997b,
p. 298). It is power’s perversion, for which Foucault usually reserves the word
Bdomination,^ that we need to be wary of, when one social group oppresses another,
leaving no room for maneuver. Nevertheless, even if power is not necessarily pejora-
tive, it is always political. For example, the political project that was industrial
1 Deleuze (1995) has argued that Discipline and Punish does not describe the rise of disciplinary societies, but
their decline. Written on the threshold of the rise of global neo-liberalism, Foucault’s analyses bear more
relevance to social regulation in Fordist factory societies than to those of current post-Fordism. In autonomist
Marxism, this interpretation is expanded.
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capitalism deployed the power-techniques developed in the madhouse and the prison,
inserting them throughout the social field in schools, hospitals, and, of course, the
factory, the assembly line being the most pregnant instantiation of it (Foucault 2003,
pp. 33, 36; see also Fraser 2003; Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 23).2
In the 1980s, Foucault’s work sparked controversy and led to some heated debate as
to whether his gloomy narrative ofmodernizing Europe placed toomuch emphasis on its
negative, dominating aspects, and too little on its emancipatory ones (Fraser 1985), with
Habermas (1981) labeling Foucault Ba young conservative^ adhering to a
Bcryptonormativist^ approach. Less focusing on his conception of modernity, and
more so on his theory of power, Lukes (2005) has argued that Foucault’s endeavors
are interesting and provocative, but do not shed any fundamental new light on what
power is, and contain wildly exaggerated statements.3 Foucault’s contention that power
is everywhere and constitutes subjects, amounts to no more than the sociological
commonplace that any notion of subjectivity is inseparable from socialization in a given
culture (in the family, at school, at work, etc.), and that subjects internalize and exhibit
cultural roles and practices as naturally given (Lukes 2005: 97).Moreover, the claim that
power is both productive and oppressive is tantamount to saying that power solicits
compliance from agents subject to it, i.e., power is seductive (Ibid. 98). Third, when
Foucault describes such a phenomenon as the Panopticon, he is not describing power in
its empirical workings, but an ideal type of a specific power-technique, carcerality in this
case. Finally, and most notoriously, it has been suggested that Foucault presents power
as an Biron cage^ which we cannot, or even should try, to escape from (Allen 1999).
Although Lukes is correct that Foucault has a penchant for the hyperbole, his
Bsociological^ critique also misfires by missing the philosophical import of Foucault’s
power theory. First, Foucault always stressed that power relations are unstable and
emerge through the struggle of forces in which Bresistance is never in a position of
exteriority in relation to power^ (1978, p. 95). But more fundamentally, Lukes socio-
logical reading does not fully appreciate the philosophical import of Foucault, or more
precisely his blend of Kantianism and Nietzscheanism; in a sense Foucault analyses a
regime of power to understand how such a mutation as that from sovereign to
disciplinary power forms as it were the Bcondition of possibility^ for such a regime
as capitalism. To claim that power constitutes subjects is equivalent to saying that we
cannot Bsimply^ rid ourselves of it, but that any engagement with power is an
engagement with Boneself^. Last, Agamben (2009a) has drawn attention to the use of
Bideal-types^ in Foucault’s work: these Bideal-types^ function not so much as abstractions
of a reality which never existed in the first place (as Lukes has it), but rather as paradigms:
just as Wittgenstein discusses the standard meter in Paris as embodying Bhow we measure
length^, the Panopticon describes Bhow we exercise power .^
The technical production of subjects is a political affair, and one that most certainly
does involve the distortion of power through domination, so the most pressing intel-
lectual question concerns the legitimate response it may entail. Let us look at two
theoretical approaches to elaborate a position on how subjects can cope with technically
2 This is not tantamount to saying that capitalism invented disciplinary power, a thesis Foucault explicitly
rejects (Foucault 1980, p. 105; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, p. 135).
3 Canonically, Lukes defines power-over as three-dimensional: power as in regulation over people’s behavior,
power as in the control over what counts as legitimate political discourse, and power as in ideological
mystification, making people do and accept things not in their interests.
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mediated power relations: a hermeneutic approach to the power of technological
mediation (Verbeek) and a dialectic approach (Feenberg).
2.1 Hermeneutic Power: Postphenomenology
Verbeek (2011, pp. 66–89) incorporates a Foucauldian power perspective in his
postphenomenological theory of technological mediation. Postphenomenology is Don
Ihde’s (1990, 1993, 2009) name for a variant of Husserlian phenomenology, one purged
of its transcendental and essentialist tendencies and injected with American pragma-
tism. From a historical point of view, postphenomenological mediation theory is an
attempt to dislodge the philosophy of technology from the methodological bias that
plagued so-called Bclassical^ philosophies of technology, such as those of Heidegger,
Ellul, Jaspers, and Mumford. Diverse as the analyses of these thinkers may have been,
they were all informed by a transcendentalist conceptualization of technology,
employing an approach that does not take as starting point concrete technologies, but
probing into the conditions of possibility. For example, Heidegger (1977) identifies the
essence of technology not with the general traits of specific artifacts but with the
historical mode of the disclosure of being called Benframing,^ an attitude that conceives
of nature as a stockpile of resources to be exploited by man. Inspired by the rise of
science and technology studies (STS) in the 1980s and 1990s, Verbeek (2005) inverts
this transcendental approach to technology by resolutely embracing what Achterhuis
(2001) calls Bthe empirical turn.^ An empirical inquiry into the meanings technologies
(in the plural) bear, so we are told, reveals a much less dark and much more pluriform
image than classical philosophy of technology would have us believe (Brey 2010;
Verbeek 2005, p. 66). This is not to say that the hermeneutic and existential questions
raised by classical philosophy are not legitimate, as mediation theory recognizes,
indeed, in steering a middle course between these and the empirical approach charac-
teristic of STS.
From a systematic point of view, Verbeek presents postphenomenology first of all as
a rejection of a naive instrumental conception of technology, that is, of the often
disreputed view of technology as a means to an end (Heidegger 1977; Feenberg
1999). Implicit in this conception is a metaphysics of the human–technology relation
as a modern ontology that classifies humans and technology as two distinct and
essentially independent realms, epitomized in the modern Cartesian dualism of res
cogitans and res extensa, the dichotomy between subject and object. The rejection of
the adequacy of this picture for life-world situations4 is inspired among other things by
the insight that technological artifacts play an active role in shaping human subjectivity,
experience, and action.
Phenomenology is the study of intentional 5 experiences, which in the end are
constituted in Bpure consciousness^ (Husserl) or in the existential structures of
Bbeing-in-the-world^ (Heidegger). Postphenomenology shifts the constitutive element
4 Of course, rejecting this picture does not mean that it does not make sense tout court: it can be argued that the
subject–object dichotomy characterizes the stance that the natural sciences take towards nature.
5 Intentionality in phenomenology refers to the directedness of experience to an object, regardless of its
(material) existence: BIn perception something is perceived, in imagination, something imagined, in a
statement something stated, in love something loved, in hate hated, in desire desired, etc.^ (Husserl
2001, p. 95).
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to the middle: neither subject nor object is primary or self-sufficient.6 For Verbeek
(2005, p. 114), the mediating role of things takes place in this middle and relates to the
very ontological status of subjectivity and objectivity:
Things are not neutral intermediaries between humans and world, but mediators:
they actively mediate this relation. (…) Mediation does not simply take place
between a subject and an object, but rather coshapes subjectivity and objectivity.
(…) Humans and the world they experience are the products of technological
mediation. (Verbeek 2005, pp. 114, 130; see also Verbeek 2012)
Verbeek’s version of postphenomenology combines both Ihde’s (1990, pp. 72–111)
views on human–technology associations and Latour’s (1994) on technical mediation.
Whereas Ihde offers a way to analyze the mediation of experience, Latour provides for
that of action. In addition, Ihde studies mediation, once constituted, as (from within)
subjective experience, whereas Latour concerns himself with the various networks out
of which mediations come into presence. Verbeek, however, focuses not so much on
this Bopening of the blackbox,^ because postphenomenology is interested Bnot so much
in the networks of relations on the basis of which the mediating artifacts and the
experiencing humans are present, but in the nature of the relations that human beings—
thanks to these artifacts—can have to other humans and things^ (2005, p. 166). Instead,
Verbeek focuses on Latour’s emphasis on hybridity, the manner in which agents of
action (Bactants^) cannot be analyzed in terms of discrete human and non-human
components.
Verbeek’s approach, and postphenomenology in general, has been criticized on the
grounds that the emphasis on how subjects and objects emerge through mediative
relations obfuscates many other aspects that are important in technological cultures.
Echoing Winner’s (1993) complaint that the empirical turn goes hand-in-hand with a
disregard for fundamental normative questions and the loss of a more systematic view
on technology, for example, Kaplan (2009) argues that the exclusive focus on subjects
and objects is insensitive to how technical artifacts, and indeed technical systems as a
whole, do not merely mediate relations between an agent and the world, but also
between society and the world (see also Feenberg 2009). Furthermore, there is no
account in Verbeek’s approach of the historical and social origins of particular
mediations. Indeed, Winner (1986) and Noble (1984) have shown that technology
can play a pivotal role in structuring and restructuring social relations, relations of
power, and even class: BPostphenomenology would benefit from a detour through the
rough ground of political economy. Otherwise, the materiality of things remains
unexplained, if not naïve to illegitimate power and authority^ (Kaplan 2009, p. 237).
Heeding this call, Verbeek (2011, pp. 66–89) refers to Foucault, both on power and
to his later work on self-constitution. This, at least in part, allows Verbeek to counter
objections of political naivety and an overemphasis on the descriptive. According to
6 Mediation is not the only way in which to incorporate the technological constitution of subjectivity into
phenomenology. Deploying Bthe logic of the trace,^ Derrida (1973) finds, at the heart of the purest spiritual
mode of being, Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, that which was supposed to have been erased: the
material world, writing in particular. Stiegler (1998) transforms this logic into a philosophy of technology in
which by means of Btertiary retentions^ (i.e., technologies), the condition of the human subject becomes that
of Boriginary technicity ,^ i.e., in the sense of being originally constituted by technology.
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Verbeek (2011, pp. 28–33), the postphenomenological figure of technological media-
tion offers a way out of the deadlock of humanistic thinking about technology. The
metaphysics of humanism, in Verbeek’s view, reinstates a divide between what is
genuinely (or even essentially) human (Kantian autonomy) and whatever is not
(technology) (see also Latour 1993). In effect, any normative discussion about tech-
nology becomes a border check for technologies that overly impinge on human
autonomy. However, the metaphysics of mediation denies any such rigid boundary
from the outset: BWe are as autonomous with regard to technology as we are with
regard to language, oxygen, or gravity. It is absurd to think that we can rid ourselves of
this dependency, because we would remove ourselves in the process^ (Verbeek 2011, p.
155). But this depiction of humanism does not emerge out of any serious engagement
with humanist authors, but, rather, deals with a straw man. The young humanist Marx
of the 1844 Paris manuscripts, for example, introduces the notion as of human being as
a Bspecies-being^ (1975, p. 329), a notion which would later be taken up and
interpreted by critical theorist Herbert Marcuse (1973). Species-being corresponds to
man’s essence. But what is the character of this essence? For Marx, it signifies man’s
laboring activity, or more precisely, man as a productive, i.e., technologically produc-
tive being, productive of nature, of the world of objects, and productive of himself: man
produces man. Man’s consciousness of its universality constitutes its freedom (Marx
1975, p. 327f.). In other words, the essence of man Marx refers to in this case is not
equivalent to some perennial autonomous sphere of human existence, which we should
not dilute too much, rather man’s essence is not opposed to history, but unfolds in its
very process, or as Marcuse (1973, p.28) puts it: Bman is taken up into the definition of
his essence (…) essence (…) can be defined in history and only in history.^ And
indeed, if we substitute Btechnology^ for Bnature^ when Marx (1975, p. 328) writes
that B[n]ature is man’s inorganic body, that is to say nature is in so far as it is not the
human body. Man lives from nature, i.e. nature is his body, and he must maintain a
continuing dialogue with it if he is not to die,^ Verbeek’s strawman is in fact his mirror
image. But this mirror image does not want to give up on the belief that man can be
alienated from his essence7: the animal-like life of the factory worker under capitalism.
For Verbeek (2011), proper engagement involves neither rejecting technology nor
embracing it wholeheartedly (see also Ruivenkamp 2005), but asking which
Btechnologically mediated subjects^ we want to be, as a preference, a question of
value, about the good life. This is an ethics not geared to humans or to technology
alone, but to Bhuman–technology associations.^ And at this point, power makes its
entrance. Foucault notoriously suggested that our reflexive experience as autonomous
subjects, as modern liberal ideology has it, is a construction of disciplinary power, aptly
captured in the inverted Platonic image in which Bthe soul is the prison of the body ,^
monitoring and (self-) disciplining its Bdocile body^ (Foucault 1977, pp. 30, 141).
Instead of taking this as a gloomy, nihilistic assertion, however, Verbeek (2011, p. 66)
reads it as an underscoring of his own theory of technological mediation: subjects are
constrained and produced by relations of power, among which some are technically
mediated, but we are not thus determined, and we have the ability to rearticulate our
technologically mediated subjectivity.
7 Next to the three other forms of man’s alienation Marx (1975) identifies: from the product, the work process,
and his fellow-man. Also note that private property, and not technology as such, is the cause of this alienation.
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In this paper, however, we are interested in the relations between capitalism, power,
and technology. While not explicitly addressing capitalism, Verbeek (2011, p. 71f.)
does indicate a position in respect of Marxism:
When power is what makes us the subjects we are, after all, a merely subversive
and rebellious attitude towards power does not offer a real alternative. I read
Foucault’s concept of power in a hermeneutic way rather than incorporating it in a
Marxist dialectic of oppression and resistance. In a hermeneutic reading, human
beings derive their subjectivity from interplay with the structures of power in
society—just as entities in general derive their meaning in interaction with the
context in which they exist. Opposing these power structures would be nonsen-
sical, since every attempt to escape them can be made only in terms of these
powers themselves.8
On this reading of the dialectical scheme, if technology is seen as oppressing
mankind in one way or another, then resistance becomes its antithesis and liberation
the sublation. Again, what sense can we ascribe to this paragraph? Verbeek seems to
suggest that dialectics are completely blind to hermeneutics, but this is blatantly wrong.
For what is historical materialism? The methodological premise that we should under-
stand human existence and society against a historical, hermeneutic background of
productive forces and their (corresponding or conflicting) relations of production. To
play some word-substitution again: replace Binterplay^ with Bdialectics^ in the quoted
fragment, and Verbeek looks upon his mirror image again.9 As we have discussed,
Marcuse (2002), for example, drawing on the Hegelianism of the young Marx, argues
that in capitalist technological consumer society, man’s existence, has been alienated
from his essence. That is to say, the human essence of freedom and self-fulfillment are
estranged in the relations of production under capitalism, in part due to the specific
technological commodities it generates. Only through the BGreat Refusal^ (Marcuse
2002, p. xxxv) of this condition can existence and essence be rejoined. A sublation
consists in such a transformation of the technical system that treats nature with the same
respect and care as would befit humans, instead of that of the domination, control, and
exploitation characteristic of capitalism. It is noteworthy that Marcuse’s dialectical view
does not encompass a wholesale rejection of technology; the point of dialectical
Aufhebung is that we do not throw out the child with the bathwater, but raise it to the
phase of maturity. Remember that for Marx himself communism is the Aufhebung of
capitalism: it is that which capitalism, unleashing the forces of human production to
their greatest historical height, becomes when it sheds exploitation.
Verbeek’s refusal to adopt the Marxist dialectical approach seems to entail more; it is
a specific political stance towards capitalism and the technologies developed under its
relations of production. We take it to entail three points. First, it consists of a denial,
similar to his rejection of the late Heidegger’s work, that every technology developed
under capitalism has as its only social meaning that of exploitation, domination, and
8 The assertion that power produces resistance is certainly a train of thought to be found in Foucault’s work.
Verbeek seems to suggest that all forms of resistance are produced by power. A more subtle problem with this
anti-dialectical position is that it neglects the full import of the Bequiprimordiality^ of power/resistance, by
granting complete primacy to power.
9 We thank this point to one of the anonymous reviewers of this article.
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control: BModern communication technologies, for instance, make it possible for
human beings to interact with others outside of their immediate environments without
necessarily approaching these people from a ‘will to power.’ And medical technologies
(…) depend on (…) care and respect^ (2005, p. 66). Of course, a dialectician like
Marcuse can easily fend off this objection by arguing that what Verbeek, and indeed
most of what is claimed by the empirically oriented sociology of technology, such as
STS with its emphasis on micro-level studies, is, in fact, both true and false: true at the
level of local practice, but false from the perspective of Btotality ,^ and thus also
fundamentally untrue. The premise to Marcuse’s dialectical approach being that any
investigation that endeavors to interpret society by solely analyzing one of its parts can
only remain at the level of semblances. Only by analyzing society in its totality, and its
unifying principles, can we move from semblance to truth. Modern communication
technologies indeed enlarge the scope of its users’ life-world, but they are also
commodities in a capitalist system suturing subjects to the capitalist mode of produc-
tion and consumption.
On a more generous reading, and secondly, the lesson to be drawn from Foucault’s
elaborations on power is that power-relations are inevitable: B[Freedom] is not to be
found in the absence of influences that constrain the subject but, rather, in dealing with
these influences. (…) One becomes a subject not by securing a place outside the reach
of power but by shaping one’s subjectivity in a critical relation to it^ (Verbeek 2011, p.
73). Verbeek (2013) claims that power should be understood as a web of relations that
give meaning to the life-world of subjects, more akin to what Ihde calls
macroperception, or what Wittgenstein calls forms of life, than to Nietzsche’s will-to-
power. Capitalist power relations, while not explicitly thematized by Verbeek, are a
subset of the many relations of power that constitute the current hermeneutic back-
ground that gives meaning to the technological life-world of subjects, and thus it
produces the way we think, act, and perceive. In this view, we have to deal
Bresponsibly^ with capitalist power relations for better or worse, Bexcept in cases of
complete domination, where technological mediation makes room for force and
compulsion^ (Verbeek 2011, p. 87). What is completely lacking in this approach to
Foucault’s work is the fact that the very form the production of subjectivity takes is
political in its own right, i.e., not merely a more or less neutral hermeneutic back-
ground; capitalism is a political project which deploys the production of subjectivities
attenuated to its requirements of capital accumulation.
Third, we need a response; if we accept the claim that a merely rebellious and
subversive attitude towards technologically mediated power relations is a dead end
street, then what remains of the category resistance? Dorrestijn (2012) and Verbeek
(2011, p. 82–89) have developed a framework for understanding how technologically
mediated subjects can thematize and reconstitute power relations embedded in artifacts.
Again, they refer to Foucault, but not to his middle work on power, but to his later work
on self-constitution. In their reading, self-constitution is explicitly ethical, as opposed to
political. In line with a hermeneutic reading of power, resistance is conceived as the
capacity of subjects to explicitly take a stance towards mediating technologies that
shape their environments. It is their capacity to find new forms of use, or to explicitly
choose certain uses of artifacts over others, or to even be involved in the very design
process of technologies, that is the locus of resistance: ‘In a technological context, self
practices consist in using technology deliberately by anticipating and modifying its
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mediating role in our existence, realizing that each way of using it also helps to shape
our subjectivity. Such self practices could be described as Btechniques of using
technology .^’ (Verbeek 2011, p. 84) Even if one might ponder why one should call
such practices resistance—doesn’t one always resist something?—the sense we can
deduce from it is a conservative political agenda: we should not negate our current
capitalist society and its concurrent technologies, but seek for manners to develop a
good life amidst these relations of power.
2.2 Dialectic Power: Critical Theory of Technology
The social implications and historical origins of technology development insufficiently
highlighted in postphenomenology are at the heart of Feenberg’s critical theory of
technology (1991, 2002), or critical constructivism (1999, 2010). Upon opening the
technological black box, Feenberg does not find it empty, but filled with that category
frowned upon by actor-network theorists yet ever so central to classical Marxist
analysis: ideology (Feenberg 1999, p. 8). Like those of Ihde and Verbeek, Feenberg’s
approach is as suspicious of the all-encompassing grand theories of classical theory as
of naïve instrumentalism, even if he does explicitly align himself in a tradition often
criticized for possessing Bsubstantive^10 tendencies, to wit, the Frankfurt School of
Adorno, Horkheimer, Benjamin, and (for Feenberg) especially Marcuse. This critique
of substantivism is reiterated by Brey (2010), who also includes the critical theorists
Marcuse, Adorno, and Horkheimer under this label, as entailing three components:
first, the image projected by these thinkers of modern technology was too dark, gloomy,
and pessimistic (see also Kiran and Verbeek 2010). This negative image belongs to the
post-war era and 1960s counterculture but Bthe mood had shifted in the 1980s and
1990s, and a different image of technology was emerging in the collective conscious-
ness that saw technology as more ambivalent: as a force that was used for both good
and ill^ (Brey 2010, p. 3). The second point is the attribution of technological
determinism to critical theory in which technology is conceived as an autonomous
and unstoppable force Brooted in scientific-rational principles and [which] did not
involve true human choices^ (Ibid.), a view which came under fire by STS scholars,
who emphasized the contingency and social construction of technology (Bijker et al.
1987). The third point of criticism against critical theory is a methodological one, viz.,
that critical theory studied technology with a capital BT^ instead of technologies in their
multifaceted empirical meanings. However, from the start it should be noted that the
various authors of the Frankfurt School all entertained different ideas on how to come
to terms with the challenge posited by Lukács and his category of totality, i.e., the
fundamental primacy of the whole over the parts, the relation between theory and
praxis, and the reifications in capitalist society (Jay 1984, see also Feenberg 2014).
Furthermore, to attribute such predicates as Bgloomy ,^ Bdark^, or Bpessimistic^ to an
approach lacks argumentative force as such, nor does a change in mood in the spirit of
times render a previous approach obsolete. Associating technological determinism of
an unstoppable, autonomous kind with the Frankfurt School is not only rhetorical but
simply false. If we take, again, Marcuse (1960) as an example, he proposes a negative,
10 Substantivism is Feenberg’s (1999, p. 9) name for philosophies of technology, which conceptualize
technology as a force with its own logic of domination.
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Hegelian thinking in which the possibility of a Bdeterminate negation^ is never
excluded, that is to say, the negation of the negation may lead to a positive resolution
in which an alternative arises which goes beyond the status quo. In less metaphysical
and more practical terms, this means that the capitalist technical system may be
transformed in a radical fashion, such that it may serve instead of inhibit human
freedom. It is true, however, that we find in Marcuse (2002, p. 157f.) the mutual, and
essential, dependence of modern science and technology on the one hand, and political
domination on the other: BThe science of nature develops under the technological
apriori which projects nature as potential instrumentality, stuff of control and organi-
zation. (…) [W]hen technics becomes the universal form of material production, it
circumscribes an entire culture; it projects a historical totality—a ‘world’.^ But this a
historical totality, and not a deterministic one. The third objection to critical theory is
not one without its history (Adorno et al. 1976). It suffices here to note that what looks
like an objective, empirical description is nothing more than bourgeois ideology seen
from the other side.
Feenberg’s redefinition of the project of critical theory departs from that of his
predecessors in critical theory in two important regards. First, very broadly, classical
critical theory was informed by the insight that Binstrumental rationality^ undergirding
modern scientific technology development was intrinsically intertwined with capitalist
domination.11 Feenberg’s (1999, pp. 202–205; 2002, pp. 175–177) instrumentalization
theory counters this substantive legacy in critical theory by the proposal of a dual level
analysis of the essence of technology: the functional aspect of the essence of technol-
ogy is captured in the so-called Bprimary instrumentalization,^ which decontextualizes
nature in the attitude that Heidegger calls Benframing^ and re-contextualizes it in
accordance with some kinds of affordance discovered. This process of de- and re-
contextualization involves power insofar as that nature and subjects are
Binstrumentalized^ in terms of functionality. For any technical device or system to
actually function, however, it must be implemented in an environment, which is
natural, technical, and social.
At this natural, technical, and social level, the level of meaning, the secondary
instrumentalization comes into play, that of social power. BThe mediation is the
message^ (2013a) insofar as that Feenberg, paradoxically, denies an opposition be-
tween neutrality and bias, between means and ends. In his view, social values—
ideology, if you like (2010, p. 68)—are pre-inscribed in the very means, in technolo-
gies. Especially in such politically relevant, technically mediated social domains as
agriculture, medicine, public transport, and infrastructure, Feenberg (1999, p. 88; 2002,
pp. 76f.; 2010, p. 68f.) finds a technical code at work, presiding over the development
of these mediations.
As suggested by the term, technical codes are literally as well as metaphorically
written (at the design level) and read (in society), and have a surreptitious,
nontransparent character. This character consists in the fact that once written into a
technical artifact it eo ipso erases its ideological and cultural underpinnings. For
example, before barrier-free design became common, the standard code written into
sidewalk design was that disability was a private problem, and thus the disabled were
discriminated against. Only by rewriting this code, by making it a public issue (e.g.,
11 See, for example Adorno and Horkheimer’s (2007) classical analysis of the Culture Industry.
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through disability rights legislation and its practical implementation in design), was this
bias stated as a problem, and thus resolved. That is to say, in a lot of cases, the technical
code obscures the fact that a solution to a technical problem is underdetermined by
technical feasibility and coherency, and Bco-determined^ by values. The insight that
specific technologies emerge as the contingent outcome of struggles over value links
Feenberg’s work to the empirically oriented philosophy of technology and STS rather
than classical critical theory, which tried to interpret the whole of society from the
perspective of totality, for example, by the general form of the commodity, or the
generalization of instrumental rationality to all domains. Put differently: formal bias is
what neutrality becomes when it is divorced from the design room and wedded to
societal context (Feenberg 2002, pp. 80–82). The most tenaciously biased of technical
codes is that of capitalism, pre-inscribing class bias in terms of efficiency, access, and
the deskilling of the labor force into the means, of which the assembly line remains
paradigmatic: B[A] strategy of technologically enforced labor discipline forms the glue
that holds together the elements. This asymmetrical effect on power is characteristic of
a strategically encoded technology^ (2002, p. 78). Power, in Feenberg’s view, pos-
sesses both a Bsubjecting^ component, in terms of the dominated subjects it produces,
and a Bclass power^ one, in terms of an asymmetry of the distribution of power over the
forces of production; capitalists (1991), or Belite classes^ (2010), consolidate and
reproduce their hegemony by wielding Boperational autonomy^ over the design of
the technical system. Feenberg (2002) explicitly acknowledges Foucault’s work, but in
the end remains closer to critical theory by localizing power in the rule over the
technical system through class bias and technocracy.
However, and contrary to many descriptively oriented empirically informed technol-
ogy studies, Feenberg is not prepared to let go of the anti-capitalist socio-critical baton
bequeathed to him by the Frankfurt School, and configures his notion of resistance along
ideologico-critical lines: a normative evaluation of the technical system is not based on
Barbitrary opinions,^ but on the dialectical notion of Hegelian-Marxian Bnegativity.^ It
is the very suppressed, ignored, and threatened needs of individuals that society fails to
address which harbor in themselves the potentiality of a reconfiguration of the technical
system. Resistance is the practice when Bthose threatened by technology (…) control
technology^ (Feenberg 1995, p. 207), when users voice public protest, of course, but
also when they reinvent for novel uses or engage in participatory design. It is the
antithesis of the rejection of technology that comprises the impetus for a sublation, in
which previously hidden potentialities are incorporated into technical mediations. Or put
in Feenberg’s own terms: secondary instrumentalizations are the locus for a democratic,
Bsubversive^ rationalization of historically sedimented technical designs.
In a sense, we can see here that Feenberg’s dialectical approach, in practice, is not so
far removed from Verbeek’s call for thinking the good life as a question of the choice
between several possible trajectories of technically mediated subjectivities opened up
by technological innovation, be it that Feenberg is more interested in the political
process that results in technological mediation, whereas Verbeek focuses on the
corresponding subjectivity. As Van Den Eede (2011) argues, postphenomenology and
critical theory of technology render some aspects of technological mediation opaque
and others transparent. If postphenomenology is good at analyzing the transformative
experiential dimension of technological mediation, then critical theory highlights biases
that may otherwise go unnoticed.
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2.3 A Struggle Between Spheres or the Question of Resistance?
One way of conceptualizing the philosophical clash between the hermeneutic
postphenomenological approach and the dialectics of critical theory is to evoke the
metaphor of a struggle between spheres. Dorrestijn (2012), for one, argues that the
notion of co-constitutive technical mediation developed by Ihde, Latour, and Verbeek is
fundamentally at odds with the critical theories of Feenberg, Kellner, and Kirkpatrick.
The latter, he argues, have not sufficiently shed off the legacy of the Frankfurt School,
in which the sphere of technology, power, and capitalism is seen as disrupting some
preconceived sphere of authentic human existence. But we have already seen in our
discussion of Verbeek that the attribution of such a preconceived sphere to classical
critical theory is based on a straw man. Verbeek (2013) provocatively suggests that
resistance, as configured in Feenberg’s critical theory, is futile insofar as it adheres to a
reificatory conceptualization of power, which Foucault was so intent on dismantling12;
Feenberg’s dialectical conception of power tacitly reinstates the modern divide between
humans and technology, in which technology is seen as threatening society in one way
or the other, or put differently, in which technology and society are at struggle.
In reply, Feenberg (2013b) concedes that his previous dialectical terminology of the
dominating and the oppressed was misleading, and that, in fact, his project is very
much in line with Verbeek’s postphenomenology in looking for ways in which
technological mediation can shape the good life. In fact, his very instrumentalization
theory is based on the acknowledgement of the technological constitution of subjec-
tivity, the whole point of his notion of a code being that subjects are technically
constituted, but that this constitution may be beneficial or detrimental to one social
group or the other.13 Struggle is no doubt at work in Feenberg’s work, but this struggle
is not between technology and society, but between social groups with differing interest
over the technical system.
The congeniality between the approaches of Feenberg and Verbeek is adumbrated in
their conceptualization of resistance as some form of democratization of technological
design—and this is the line of thought we want to call into question. In itself, any
notion of Bdemocratization^ remains empty: the precise way in which it is filled out is
crucial. Feenberg, in Transforming Technology, identifies democratization with the
civilizational project of overturning capitalism and instituting socialism. Socialism,
collective ownership of the means of production, is tantamount to democracy insofar
as there is no specific social group or class that is favored by the possession of
operational autonomy over the technical system. In his more recent work, however,
12 While Foucault’s Nietzschean genealogical analysis of how the Enlightenment project, aimed at the
liberation of mankind from unwarranted traditional dogma, was in fact complicit to its further oppression,
bears a striking resemblance to Adorno and Horkheimer’s dialectical argument of how liberation entailed its
contrary position, and Foucault’s acknowledged debt to the latter—BI acknowledge the merits of the Frankfurt
School philosophers, I do so with the bad conscience of someone who should have read them long before^—
(Foucault 2002, p. 274), we do also find remarks, which support Verbeek’s position: BSimplifying things, one
could say, for the moment, that the conception of the subject adopted by the Frankfurt School was rather
traditional, philosophical in nature—it was permeated with Marxist humanism^ (ibid.).
13 Lotz (2011) points out, however, that Feenberg does not elaborate on the category of the Bsocial^ enough,
and veers close to a form of Bsocial idealism,^ the position in which technology development is merely the
outcome of social struggle, neglecting for example that technology development itself transforms the
embodiment in which social struggle takes place.
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Feenberg’s position has gravitated towards pragmatism in looking for ways to mitigate
the effects of capitalist hegemony within the system itself (Hickman 2006).
For example, Feenberg’s (1999, pp. 140–147) notions of Bparticipant interests^ and
Bdeep democratization^ still have a remotely dialectical ring to them in the sense in
which marginalized interests challenge hegemonic ones, but they are far removed from
the Marxist tradition in trying to reduce Bthe operational autonomy of experts and
managers,^ as well as combine Bthe democratic rationalization of technical codes with
electoral controls on technical institutions^ (ibid., p. 146). What is postulated in more
radical versions of Marxism is the thesis that problems of power and authority cannot
be resolved within the framework of the bourgeois state, its institutions, and its republic
of property, or rather, that this framework with such distinctions as public/private,
producer/consumer is part and parcel of the very problem (Hardt 2010).
Verbeek (2011, p. 89–121), wary of allegations of apologetics to technocracy, also
calls for the democratization of technical design through user involvement. The impact
of technical mediation on the good life leads Verbeek to the question how engineers, in
the design process of mediating artifacts, can explicitly engage with this impact in a
normative way.14 Put another way, if the Btechnical design of life^ is not to lapse into
technocratic rule, the users of these mediating artifacts need to be consulted. Contrary
to Feenberg’s reference to socialism, Verbeek (2005) builds this technical design of the
good life around the (ideal of) liberal democracy.
It should not go unsaid that Feenberg’s sympathy for phenomenology and
pragmatism has a history of animosity, and that his concessions are far from
unproblematic. Adorno (1973) launched a vehement attack against Heidegger’s Kier-
kegaardian Bfideism^, defending critical reason against a cultus of Bauthenticity .^ But
aside from polemics, Adorno (2013) engaged into a more thoroughgoing
Bdeconstruction^ of the very foundations of phenomenology, viz., Husserl’s notions
of evidence, phenomenological reduction, and eidetic reduction. In particular, Adorno
refuses the phenomenologist’s assumption that experience can be the starting point of
philosophical analysis; in Adorno’s view subject and object mediate one another
dialectically, always being transformed by the other. Also, the ideological underpin-
nings of pragmatism could not withstand the critique Horkheimer (1947) leveled
against it, who derided its explanation of truth in terms of success as veiling a longing
for capitalist acquisition of wealth.
To return to our discussion, Verbeek’s position differs from Feenberg’s not funda-
mentally but only in terms of emphasis: the essence of resistance boils down to Bmore
democratic and participatory procedures^ (Feenberg 2010, p. 213). In capitalist society,
one may surmise that such participatory engagement remains severely limited for the
simple reason that there is no incentive for industry to engage in any significant
democratization for any reason beyond that of the market (cynically, as contributing
to its own dynamic) or public institutional force (under duress, as required by or
through the authority of the state) (Brey 2010). For Verbeek (2013), albeit not
neglecting the democratization of technology, Feenberg indulges in what Foucault
(1997c) called the Bblackmail of Enlightenment^, the false dilemma in which if one
14 This line of thought is also present in the work of Hardt and Negri’s Marxist appropriation of Foucault,
namely, that Bimmaterial labor^ is directly Bbio-political^, i.e., productive of the forms of social life. This
politico-economic dimension of the production of subjectivity is completely lacking in Verbeek’s analysis.
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does not fully embrace an emancipatory agenda, one is against it: either technology is
democratized through more electoral control and the development of democratic
institutions, or ruthless technocracy shall be our fate. As we have seen, for Verbeek
self-practices in which subjects shape their technical environments present an alterna-
tive form of democratization. But does not this take us back to where we came in, to a
new form of blackmail? One either accepts the current liberal private-public framework
and the capitalist system, or Bresistance is futile^?
3 Technological Mediation and Autonomist Marxism
BEven though common use of the term might suggest the opposite—that resistance is a
response or reaction—resistance is primary with respect to power^ (Hardt and Negri
2004: 64). This common usage of the term Bresistance^ can be found in the power
perspectives on technological mediation elaborated in postphenomenology and critical
theory. Conceptualizing resistance as such is a specific political choice, or, more precise-
ly, a choice on the form of political struggle: we either accept capitalism as the current
hermeneutic background against which all forms of technological mediation must
inevitably take place, or we negate capitalism by trying to reduce its destructive force.
In both approaches, however, the position of subjects is reactive in the sense that primacy,
in the end, is granted to capital, to which labor can respond in one way or the other.
3.1 Biopower and the Social Factory
Autonomist Marxism is that school of Marxism centered on the class struggle (Wright
2002), as opposed to more conventional political economist readings of Marx focused
on capital accumulation, or philosophical ones such as those of the Frankfurt School
(Cleaver 2000). Class, per definition, is the relation of a social group to the means of
production, and class antagonism comes to the fore when a class constitutes itself as
engaging in struggle, as resisting. In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and
Engels (2002) identify the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie
as the catalyst for revolutionary change: the proletariat is identified as the revolu-
tionary subject for the very reason that it is able to constitute itself as a class of
resistance against capitalist domination, as opposed to, say, the lumpenproletariat,
that class of Bproletarians^ never likely to gain class consciousness. This primacy
in politico-economic analysis of the class struggle from the perspective of labor
and the constitution of the working class as agent of resistance form the corner-
stones of 1960s and 1970s Italian operaismo or workerism, out of which present
day (post) Autonomia (and post-Operaismo as well) branched. 15 The central
antagonism in capitalist society is that between those who produce and those
who appropriate. But while capital, for its survival and reproduction, needs the
productive forces of labor as the source of surplus value, the inverse does not
hold: in theory, labor is autonomous (Dyer-Witheford 2004, p. 7).
15 Operaismo refers to the Italian school of Marxism focused on factory workers, revolving around such
figureheads as Tronti and Panzieri. Autonomia signifies a more broad social movement, of which Negri is the
most well-known proponent (Dyer-Witheford 2004, p. 25).
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In its study of the elements that constitute power relations in capitalist class society,
present day autonomists rely just as heavily on the neo-Nietzscheanism of Foucault and
Deleuze as they do on the more traditional, Marxist dyad of capital and labor—and
which forms the connection to the discourse on technologically mediated subjectivity.
In effect, the dialectical Hegelian-Marxian notions such as Btotality ,^ Balienation^, and
Bsublation^ are replaced by Foucauldian and Deleuzian notions such as Bdispositif^,
Bcontrol^ and Bbiopolitics^ (Berardi 2009, p. 116). In particular, efforts have been
made to transpose the Foucauldian notion of biopower onto a Marxian framework
(Berardi 2005; Hardt and Negri 2000, 2009; Lazzarato 2002, 2004; Negri 2008a, b).
Foucault (1978, pp. 135–159; 2003, pp. 242–262) identifies biopower as the
eighteenth century emergence of a set of techniques aimed at the (biological) manage-
ment of the productive forces of populations and the discovery of man as a species-
being, 16 which came to full fruition in the welfare-state model. It includes such
regulatory mechanism as health-insurance systems, rules of public hygiene, statistical
predictions of mortality rate, child-care, or in short the very fostering of life, instead of
the denial of life characteristic of sovereign power. Although Foucault differentiates it,
as do the autonomist, from disciplinary power, which is aimed at the drilling and
exercising of individual bodies, he does speak of infiltration: BThis technology of
power does not […] exclude disciplinary technology, but it does dovetail into it,
integrate it, modify it to some extent, and above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it,
embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques^ (2003, p. 242). As Nealon (2008,
pp. 83–85) has pointed out, the link between autonomist Marxism and Foucauldian
biopower can be found in the autonomists’ reliance on a short segment from Marx’
Grundrisse, BThe Fragment on Machines^ (Notebooks 6 and 7), in which Marx
speculates that with the advent of machinery, a new form of labor altogether arises,
viz., the moment when all facets of social life become a force of production:
The production process has ceased to be a labour process in the sense of a process
dominated by labour as its governing activity. Labour appears, rather, merely as a
conscious organ, scattered among the individual living workers at numerous
points of the mechanical system; subsumed under the total process of the
machinery, as itself only a link in the system, whose unity exists not in the living
workers, but rather in the (active) machinery, which confronts his individual,
insignificant doings as a mighty organism. (Marx 1993, p. 693)
For Negri (2008b, p. 230) Foucault’s analysis of the advent of biopower is Bthe other
side^ (i.e., in terms of the exercise of power instead of Marxian politico-economics) of
Marx’ description of the transition from formal subsumption of labor under capital to
real subsumption of labor under capital. Formal subsumption is the dialectical, prole-
tarianizing process by which previously existing labor processes (e.g., agriculture) are
brought under capitalist wage-labor relations. This process relies on an Bother^, non-
proletarianized field of labor which capital subsumes under its relations of production
(as it were centrifugally). But at a certain point this process must come to a halt; real
subsumption is the process by which capital starts fashioning the labor process, and
indeed, society as a whole (as it were centripetally) (Dyer-Witheford 2004, p. 10; see
16 Sexuality being his prime example.
Technological Mediation and Power
also Griffioen and Van Tuinen 2009). For the autonomist more generally, biopower
refers to the power over life, when life itself is put to work under capitalist exploitation,
when individual and social life itself are subsumed under capitalist sway (Casarino and
Negri 2008; Lazzarato 2004; Morini and Fumagalli 2010). No longer limited to the
confines of the factory, the capitalist mode of production permeates the entire social
field, including public and private life, or in short, the (technical) production of
subjectivity itself. Another way of saying this is that the real subsumption of society
under capital (Negri) is the Btotal triumph of Foucauldian biopower^ (Nealon 2008, p.
84).17 In terms of technology, following Deleuze’s (1995) brief sketch, Hardt and Negri
argue that with the rise of among others digital networks, we have witnessed a
qualitative shift in the hegemonic form biopower takes: BThe society of control might
thus be characterized by an intensification and generalization of the normalizing
apparatuses of disciplinarity that internally animate our common and daily practices,
but in contrast to discipline, this control extends well outside the structured sites of
social institutions through flexible and fluctuating networks^ (2000, p. 22).18 Berardi
(2009) points to the example of precarious flex-workers whose mobile devices make
them permanently available at-a-distance, everywhere, at any time of the day. In
consonance with the diffusion of the factory throughout social life, the class struggle
is re-conceptualized accordingly. No longer taking place solely, or even most impor-
tantly, between the blue-collar worker and the entrepreneurial capitalist, but spread
throughout the socius, the exploited class includes white collars, peasants,
houseworkers, hackers, or what Hardt and Negri (2004) and Virno (2004) call the
Bmultitude^: a heterogeneous set of singularities potentially united in a struggle, as
much as the industrial proletariat was in the time of Marx and Engels, against the
exploitation of biopower.
3.2 The Power of Antagonism
Biopower understood as the proliferation of the capitalist mode of production through-
out social life is not the only Foucauldian insight the autonomist incorporates:
[T]here is always a minor current that insist on life as resistance, an other power
of life that strives toward an alternative existence. The perspective of resistance
17 And of course, this is only a short step away from the second pivotal concept the autonomists derive from
the Grundrisse, that of the general intellect or of immaterial labor. For, if social life itself becomes a force of
production in its own right, this implies the capitalist exploitation of knowledge and skills so central to
contemporary cognitive capitalism: BThe accumulation of knowledge and skill, of the general productive
forces of the social brain, is thus absorbed into capital, as opposed to labour, and hence appears as an attribute
of capital, and more specifically fixed capital, in so far as it enters into the production process as a means of
production proper^ (Marx 1993, p. 694).
18 The criticism that their Deleuzian appropriation of Foucault is exegetically not true to Foucault’s work has
been leveled at Hardt and Negri by Rabinow and Rose: BThis conception of biopower is quite antithetical to
that proposed by Foucault: the concept is emptied of its critical force—it can describe everything but analyse
nothing. (…) [Biopower] was not trans-historical or metaphoric, but precisely grounded in historical, or
genealogical analysis^ (2006, p. 199). For Rose and Rabinow, biopower refers to a specific power technique
aimed at the health of populations and does not necessarily serve the power-bloc of capitalism. In defense of
Hardt and Negri, it can be noted that Foucault does see biopower as Bdesigned to maximize and extract forces^
(2003, p. 246), or the even stronger claim that their Bmetaphoric^ reading of Foucault is true to Foucault by not
Breading^ him but by Busing^ his ideas as a Btoolbox^.
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makes clear the difference between these powers: the biopower against which we
struggle is not comparable in its nature or form to the power of life by which we
defend and seek our freedom. To mark this difference between the two Bpowers
over life,^ we adopt a terminological distinction, suggested by Foucault’s writ-
ings but not used consistently by him, between biopower and biopolitics, where-
by the former could be defined (rather crudely) as the power over life and the
latter as the power of life to resist and determine an alternative production of
subjectivity. (Hardt and Negri 2009, p. 57)19
Capitalist development relies on a subject, the working class, that is internally
antagonistic to capital’s goals of the maximization of profit: Not only does the working
class strive for a reduction of labor time or an increase in wage, it can also resist by
means of Bthe refusal of work^ (sabotage, coming in late, etc.). Moreover, Brefusal of
work^ can also have a positive meaning, namely to refuse to work for capital by
developing modes of production outside capital relations and instituting the corre-
sponding subjectivities. These two meanings of resistance coincide nicely with the ones
Foucault envisaged: power works on resistance, and is indeed dependent on it. For
example, the power relation that is discipline needs the prisoner, who will not be turned
into a docile body, or Bnormalization^ only functions by categorizing Babnormal^
individuals:
BYou see, if there was no resistance, there would be no power relations. Because
it would be simply a matter of obedience. (…) So resistance comes first, and
resistance remains superior to the forces of the process; power relations are
obliged to change with the resistance. So I think that resistance is the main word,
the key word, in this dynamic.^ (Foucault 1997d, p. 167, emphasis in original)
Deleuze (2006, p. 74) captures this insight, running ambiguously through the work
of Foucault, in the slogan that BThe final word on power is that resistance comes first.^
But for Foucault resistance can also go beyond saying no:
19 To be sure, Hardt and Negri’s blend of Marx and Foucault has problems of its own and has indeed met with
vast criticism, from both traditional and autonomist Marxists alike. According to Callinicos (2001) Hardt and
Negri replace historical materialism with a theory of power and subjectivity, and by doing so lose sight of all
valuable in politico-economic analysis (the concept of value, wages, the division of labor etc.) in descriptive
terms. But this critique also extends to their adherence to a Bpostmodernist^ conceptions of hybridity and
multiculturalism which he claims do not provide any strategic means for battling the inequalities caused by
globalization (see also Sprague 2011). In a similar vein Thompson (2005) rejects any reconciliation between
Foucauldian and Marxist approaches and even sees Hardt and Negri’s Bsmooth^ capitalism as apologetic to
the status quo. Moreover, their conception of a dispersed, but unified multitude fails to understand the
dynamics of class composition. We tend to agree with this critique insofar as that Hardt and Negri never
reflect thoroughly on their mixture of Marx and Foucault, although we do not find Foucault’s power concept
unintelligible as Thompson does. At the time of writing Discipline and Punish and the first volume to The
History of Sexuality Foucault’s main adversaries were Borthodox^Marxists (as opposed to Marx himself) who
believed that power in capitalist society could be battled by abolishing class power only. Foucault’s intention
was, of course, to show how such mere dispossession could leave power relations in their place. But this does
not necessarily imply that class power and Foucauldian power cannot meet: the very example of commons-
based production we refer to on page 19 exhibits that Bsubjectivation^ and (struggle against) class power can
accompany each other.
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Resistance was conceptualized only in terms of negation. Within your under-
standing, however, resistance is not merely a negation but a creative process; to
create and recreate, to change the situation, actually to be an active member in
that process (Foucault 1997d, p. 167).20
When grafted onto a politico-economic context, resistance becomes the practice
when labor challenges capitalist relations of production not through an ideological
critique of the superstructure, as Feenberg has it,21 but in the productive circuit itself.
And contrary to Verbeek’s suggestion that such resistance is inherently technophobic,
this resistance can be technically mediated itself: We can think, for example, of
Söderberg (2007), who has studied the activities of the Free Software movement in
the 1980s and 1990s as a form of class struggle that tried to challenge the relations of
production of proprietary software by subverting this very relation in the productive
process. Stallman (2002) describes his practices of the initiation of the free software
movement and its Bcopyleft^ GNU license as a practice of technical self-constitution
that is not merely rebellious but productive of new relations of production in its own
right. Stallman opposes the de-autonomizing ways in which proprietary software
functions in both development and consumer environments, and proposes an alterna-
tive strategy of producing and consuming software in which the opposition between
user and producer is reconfigured, and in which subjects are enabled to rethink and
modify the software that animates their daily interactions (see also Gorz 2010, pp. 114–
129; Moulier Boutang 2011, pp. 83–91). This resistance is not reactive, but active and
creative, because it opens new routes toward subjectivation, inventing new paths
towards a regained autonomy. As Lazzarato (2002) points out, resistance is a set of
strategic relations, just as dominating power is, but a set that thwarts any system of
domination by inventing new subjectivities through a reversal of the asymmetrical
dispositifs which that very system institutes (see also Negri 2008a, b). The point of
resistance here is that it does not negotiate the values of the technical system, as in
Feenberg’s theory, but transforms the very relations, and subjectivities, on which
production is based. In the latest installment of their Empire trilogy, Commonwealth,
Hardt and Negri identify the common(s) as an alternative production system to either
state-governed (the public) or market-governed (private) systems. Examples of such
commons-based production models with regard to cyber-commons are described by
Benkler (2006) under the heading commons-based peer production. Ruivenkamp
(2005) points to the example of alternative ways of deploying biotechnologies outside
of corporate proprietary, industrial relations, but in support of local agricultural devel-
opment. We could call such practices Btechnologies of the self^, with the added remark
20 Of course, Foucault himself did not see the class struggle as the most perennial, or even most important
power-relation, if only for the fact that it locates power in the capital-labor relation as opposed to his own
Bcapillary ,^ bottom-up, investigation into the micro-physics of power.
21 Feenberg’s dialectical roots are evident when he writes apropos of Deleuze that B[t]he reference to an
amorphous subject of resistance constituted prior to the cultural encoding of individuality offers only a
prerational basis for opposition: chaos or madness as a metaphor for political opposition. (…) It seems
obvious that resistance must operate not merely on the level of microtechniques, but at the level of metapowers
if it is to counter this constructive movement of capitalist hegemony .^ (…) [Marcuse] admits that most forms
of resistance, vital or not, can be absorbed by the system, and that, far from threatening it, they contribute to its
dynamism (2002, p. 71).
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that they do not remain limited to the existential level, but in fact represent a
Bgovernment of the self and others^ at the collective level.
However, akin but in the end dissimilar to Marcuse’s notion of repressive
desublimation, in which the system is able to deploy counter-resistances in order to
uphold and strengthen its own hegemony, autonomists are very aware of the fact that
resistance does not necessarily overthrow the system in a simple act of affirmative
antagonism. As the stated example of free software perfectly illustrates, we have
witnessed in the last decades the rise of corporate open source software development
(OSI, Apache, Android), conceived as a business model in the service of capital—to the
ironic extent, even, of the CEO of the world’s largest social network describing himself
as a Bhacker^ (Newfield 2013). Interestingly, though, this does support the notion of
capital as a reactive force (Deleuze 1986): aimed at controlling and incorporating
practices of freedom, capital continuously restructures the relations of production in
response to the ongoing struggle of labor towards freedom. Negri (1991) couches this
relation in the anti-dialectical, non-teleological Spinozian terms of potestas and
potentia, constituted and constituent power, analogous to pouvoir and puissance in
Foucault’s work: the anti-Hegelian position in which there is no teleological prime
mover to historical development such as the negation of the negation.
More systematically, the technical production of subjectivity can be characterized as
differing from the postphenomenological view in the sense in which it does not remain
confined to an artifact–agent relationship. As for Feenberg, the production of techni-
cally mediated subjectivity is a political affair, even if the autonomists do not use the
word Bmediation^ and plunge the ideological back into the thoroughly materialist: the
subject emerges through the constitution of a heterogeneous set of elements, through
the concatenation of the material, scientific, legal, and economic mechanism at work in
society. The subject is constituted by the dispositifs of power:
What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous
ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical,
moral and philanthropic propositions (…) [T]he apparatus itself is the system
of relations that can be established between these elements. Secondly, what I am
trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection that
can exist between these heterogeneous elements. (…) Thirdly, I understand by the
term Bapparatus^ a sort of—shall we say—formation which has as its major
function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need.
(Foucault 1980, p. 195)
That is to say, subjects are the effects of a Nietzschean play of Bforce upon force,^ of
the arrangement of these forces, a strategic relation (Berardi 2005; Hardt and Negri
2000, p. 329ff; 2009, p. 126; Lazzarato 2002; Negri 2008a).22 Insofar as these strategic
relations have not crystallized into complete domination, the relation between the
elements can be reconfigured, in a strategic relation of resistance, in an alternative
productive of subjectivity, a Bgovernment of the self and others.^ Dispositifs of power
can be politically motivated relations of domination, but also political relations of
22 See also Agamben (2009b) and Tiqqun (2011).
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resistance. The dispositifs of the present day produces for example not merely Bdocile
bodies^ but Bthe precarious worker^, or the Bself-entrepreneur^ (Foucault 2008).
3.3 Towards an Understanding of the Technological Mediation of the Class Struggle
Taken together, the diffusion of the class struggle, and the role of the class struggle as
the propeller for capitalist development and liberation from it, offer a different per-
spective on how to understand the relation between power, resistance, and technolog-
ical mediation from the ones developed in postphenomenology and critical theory of
technology. To be sure, technological mediation is not a term often employed in the
autonomist school. A leading theme, however, is the one initiated by Panzieri (1980),
who developed a non-determinist understanding of technology as political weaponry
(Bconstant capital^), developed and deployed by capital to replace, undermine, control,
or in short battle its internal antagonist, the working class (Bvariable capital^). These
weapons are not neutral, but, like for Feenberg, already imply the capitalist mode of
production. Berardi (2009) follows up on these insights by arguing that neo-liberal
capital (Bsemiocapital^), after the struggles of factory workers in the 1970s for more
flexibility, has produced a new, flexible, precarious proletariat (Bcognitariat^) through
the deployment of digital networks, underscoring the premise that capital is an inher-
ently reactive force. Hardt and Negri, hailed as the Marx and Engels of the internet era
(Žižek 2001), albeit aware that digital technologies can enhance the further surveillance
and control of the multitude in a Bvirtual Panopticon^ (2000, p. 297), also point out that
Bevery tool is a weapon if you hold it right^ (ibid., p. v), implying that the weapons of
biopower can also be refitted to be wielded against capital itself.23
The image of weaponry suggests that the technical system mediates the class
struggle, or more precisely, conditions the form the class struggle takes. As conven-
tional warfare is conditioned by the technological development of weaponry (from the
trench warfare of World War I to the threat of nuclear warfare during the Cold War), so
is the class struggle. For example, in the field of agriculture, the development of
biotechnology and genomics has made the ownership of the genetic information
contained in seed one of the most pressing issues of social struggles. Whereas farmers
have used this genetic information for centuries through practical know-how, the
scientific possibility of identifying knowledge-intensive genes, and their privatization
through patenting, constitutes farmers as engaged in class struggle against life science
companies and universities claiming ownership of plant genetic resources (Hardt and
Negri 2004, pp. 112–114; Kloppenburg 2005). At the same time, the very same
biotechnologies (potentially) offer farmers new ways of improving their local practices
by tailoring these technologies to their own needs (Ruivenkamp 2005).
We thus believe that the phenomenon of technological mediation provides autono-
mist theory with both an empirical and philosophical challenge. While the bulk of
autonomist theory tends to focus solely on digital technologies, Birch and Tyfield
(2013) have argued for the pertinence of autonomia and its focus on labor as the source
23 In their Empire trilogy, Hardt and Negri oscillate between arguing for an antagonistic Bentrepreneurship of
the multitude^ (2009, p. 306) and the more classic dialectial Bgravedigger^ hypothesis, that current biopolitical
production contradicts the capitalistic regime of property (ibid., pp. 131–159). These two arguments are not
necessarily mutually exclusive: an entrepreneurship of the multitude performatively exhibits the contradiction
in the capitalist mode of production.
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of all value, for the bio-economy. Especially with the emerging field of BOpen Source
Biotechnology^ (Hope 2008), this perspective becomes ever more relevant. Moreover,
while we have focused in this article on how Autonomia, through its Foucault-inspired
theory of subjectivity, can be linked to the phenomenon of technical mediation through
its notion of the production of subjectivity (expressed as through dispositifs), there is
still need for a stronger, more encompassing theory of how we are to understand the
relations between the technical system and autonomia’s central category, the class
struggle.
4 Conclusion
In this article, we have discussed and compared three positions on the intertwinement
of technological mediation, power, and resistance within capitalist society through an
analysis of the various ways in which they incorporate a power-perspective. First, we
discussed the hermeneutic postphenomenological view developed by Verbeek, and
Feenberg’s dialectic critical theory, and then we brought these together for a first
approximation of autonomist philosophy of technology.
Instead of invoking the metaphor of a struggle between spheres to characterize
critical theory in contradistinction to co-constitutive postphenomenological medi-
ation, it was argued that postphenomenology and critical theory are best under-
stood as complementary. While the former excels at analyzing technical mediation
at the experiential level, the latter succeeds in highlighting social biases that may
elude the untrained eye. Furthermore, it was argued that Verbeek’s liberal-
democratic power perspective is not radically different from Feenberg’s socialism,
at least in the way in which they conceptualize the category of resistance: subjects
shape and transform their technically mediated subjectivity in search of the good
life against the background of a web of meaning-giving power relations they
neither can nor (thus) should try to fully escape, or else social groups try to
mitigate the detrimental effects of technical mediations implemented by the
(capitalist) system by revealing and negotiating their (thus its) ideological and
cultural underpinnings. This different emphasis, which really follows from their
metaphysics, converges in a conception of resistance as a form of democratization
in the design of mediating technical artifacts.
In the second part, we argued that the antagonistic conceptualization of power
relations developed in autonomist Marxism offers an alternative way of articulat-
ing technically mediated resistance. We did this by juxtaposing the autonomist
appropriation of the political production of technological subjects through Fou-
cauldian dispositifs of biopower with the hermeneutic and dialectical approach. By
grafting this Foucauldian conception onto a Marxist framework, it was argued that
antagonistic resistance should be understood as a (technically mediated) practice
of challenging, displacing, and thwarting capitalist relation of production and
subjectification by a subversion of the circuit of production itself. In so doing,
we sketched the contours of an autonomist philosophy of technology. Technolog-
ically mediated practices such as open source and commons-based production are
reshuffling such concepts as designer/user, or public/private, and they are defi-
nitely changing the very face of capitalism. Paraphrasing Deleuze, we could say
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that it is not a question of worrying or hoping for the best, but of refitting our
weapons.
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